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1. INTRODUCTION AND AN EQUILIBRIUM THEOREM 
Intrinsic to the theory of nonzero-sum games is an underlying desire 
among players to form some cooperation, which in no-sense is a binding 
contract. This notion of cooperation without compulsion requires either 
initiation by a third party or some form of preplay communication. In a 
seminal paper [l], Aumann introduced one such scheme for normal form 
(matrix) games, called correlation in randomized strategies. Correlated 
equilibria are, in some sense, extensions of Nash equilibrium solutions. The 
advantages of using correlated equilibria in matrix games are many. They 
form a compact convex set for any matrix game and can be computed via 
linear programming methods. Very often some correlated equilibria yield 
higher expected payoffs for all players compared to Nash equilibrium 
payoffs (see [I, 11, 121 for details). Some interesting variations and exten- 
sions of Aumann’s approach to correlation in nonzero-sum games are 
included in [7, 111 and some applications to economic theory can be 
found, for example, in [9]. 
In this paper we define correlated strategies for differential games and 
introduce a solution concept, which is inspired by Moulin’s approach to 
correlated equilibria [9, 11, 121. We consider linear differential games of 
prescribed duration. 
In this section we assume that the players receive no information about 
the state variables during the play, except for their initial values which are 
common knowledge from the start. Hence, open-loop strategies are 
considered. Our correlation scheme is based on relaxed control theory. In 
Section 3, we also discuss correlated equilibria in closed-loop strategies. 
Let .N= { 1, 2, . . . . m} be the set of players. Consider an m-person linear 
differential nonzero-sum game of prescribed duration with 
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TV T= [0, 11, as the dynamical system with starting point x(0)=x0 and 
with the payoff function for player ie N, 
P;(f,, . . . f,J=L,(x)+ j  ir, 
‘I 
... jIm Qi(t, ~1, . . . . u,,) 
xf,(du, I t) .~..fm(du,,, I t) dt. 1 (2) 
Here, we make the following assumptions: 
(i) C is a (n xn)-matrix-valued function on T with Bore1 
measurable and integrable components. 
(ii) U1, . . . . U, are nonempty compact metric spaces of control 
variables of players 1, . . . . m, respectively. We put U = ni, N Ui; that is, U 
is the Cartesian product of Uls. We assume that U is given the product 
topology. 
(iii) D is a Bore1 measurable P-valued function on TX U such that 
D(t, .) is continuous on U, for each TV T, and the function 
t-+max,,,J II D( t, u)ll is integrable over T. 
We let P( Vi) denote the space of all probability measures on U,, 
endowed with the weak-star topology. 
(iv) f, , . . . . f, are relaxed control functions chosen once for all by 
players 1, . . . . m, respectively. We remind that f, is a Bore1 measurable 
mapping from T into P( Ui). 
By our assumptions (i)-(iv), a unique absolutely continuous solution x 
of (1) exists, for any relaxed control functions .fi, . . . . f,. 
(v) For every player i E N, L, is a linear continuous functional on 
the Banach space of R”-valued continuous functions on T, endowed with 
the norm of uniform convergence. 
(vi) For every in N, Qi is a real-valued function on T x U such that 
Qi(t, ‘) is continuous on U, for each TV T, and the function 
t + max,, U lQi(f, u)l is integrable over T. 
Nash equilibria are known to exist only in some very special cases of our 
game as linear quadratic games or games satisfying the following 
separability conditions :
D(t,u, ,..., ~,)=D,(t,u~)+ ... +D,(t,u,), 
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(3) 
Q;(t> ~1, .. . . ~rn)=Q,‘(wA+ ... +Qi’Tt,d, 
for every player i and for all t E T, (ul, . . . . u,) E U. For more details consult 
[2,4, 8, 14, 151, their references, and Remark 5. 
In this paper we extend the set of strategies available to the players by 
allowing them to correlate their decisions during a preplay communication 
process. We show that such an extended model has an equilibrium 
solution. 
A correlated relaxed strategy Q for the players specifies, for each moment 
t E T, a probability (not necessarily product) measure on U such that the 
mapping t -+ a(. ) t) from T into P(U) is Bore1 measurable. We let Z denote 
the set of all correlated relaxed strategies for the players. We also use C to 
denote the quotient space of all equivalence classes of relaxed control 
functions 6: T + P(U) which are equal almost everywhere. It is well known 
that Z is a compact convex and metrizable space, when endowed with the 
weak-star topology. For details see [ 16, Chap. IV]. We only mention that 
a sequence {o”} converges to cr” in Z as n + co iff we have 
[ [ j- 
T U 
46 u) C’Ydu I I)] dt+ s, [s, 42, u) a’@ I t)] dt 
as n + 00, for every h satisfying the following two conditions: 
(a) h(t, .) is continuous on U, for each t E T, and 
(b) t+max,,. (h(t, u)l is integrable over T. 
To formulate our solution concept, we introduce some additional nota- 
tion and definitions. Let U-i=nj.N--ji) Uj, where HEN. Then Xi is the 
set of sequences of control variables of all players but player i. Let nei be 
the projection mapping from U on U_ i. For each Bore1 set G in Ki, we 
put G x Ui := (Z _ i))l (G), i E N. Then G x Ui is a Bore1 subset of U. 
With any correlated control 0 EC and player iE N, we associate the 
marginal relaxed control G _ i : T -+ P( U -i) defined as follows. If G is a Bore1 
subset of Uhi, then oei(G 1 t) :=o(Gx Ui 1 t). Clearly, for each te T, 
D -i(. 1 t) is the marginal probability distribution of sequences of control 
variables of all players but player i, generated by a(. 1 t). We use C ~ i to 
denote the set of all marginal control functions cr -i determined by all 0 E Z, 
for a fixed ie N. By Zi we denote the space of all (private) controlfunctions 
of player i E N. 
Suppose the players have decided to use a correlated relaxed strategy (T 
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to control the system. By [ 10, Chap. I, Sect. lo], the unique absolutely 
continuous solution to (1) (with fi, . . . . f, replaced by G) has the form 
x(r) = A(t) 
I 
x0 + j’ n-‘(s) 
0 
1 D(s, 24) a(du Is) ds 
u I , (4) 
where .4 denotes the principal homogeneous olution. 
The expected payoff to player i E N is then 
The rules for the game are as follows. First, a correlated relaxed strategy 
CJ E C is fixed by the players during a preplay communication (perhaps with 
the help of a neutral arbiter). Then the players make their final decisions 
independently of each other. Every player has the right to change his mind 
and choose a private control function. Suppose player i has secretly decided 
on the second stage to use his private strategy fie Zi while the other 
players have not changed their first decisions approving the correlated 
strategy 0. Then the game is played (realized) by using the control function 
fi E Xi and the marginal control function cr --i induced by G on behalf of the 
remaining players. The payoff to player i in such a situation is denoted by 
Pi(fi, ePi). This payoff is obtained by replacing (3 in (4) and (5) with the 
product relaxed control function t +fi(. 1 t) x a-,(. I t) from T to P(U). 
We say that a relaxed strategy rs *: T -+ P(U) is a correlated equilibrium 
point for our game iff 
pi( P,(fi, a’;) (6) 
for every player i E N, and every fi E Zi. 
If rr* is a correlated equilibrium point, then unilateral deviations from it 
are not profitable. 
This solution concept contains as a special case that of Nash equilibrium. 
If G* is the product control function determined by some f* EC, 
(i= 1, . . . . m) and satisfies (6) for every player i and for all fi 62’;) then 
u”:, ..., fit) is a Nash equilibrium point. We do not know whether our 
games always possess Nash equilibrium points. Nevertheless, we have the 
following result. 
EQUILIBRIUM THEOREM. Euery linear differential game satisfying (i k( iii), 
(v), and (vi) has an open-loop-correlated relaxed equilibrium point. 
Remark 1. Suppose the separability conditions (3) are satisfied and o* 
is a correlated relaxed equilibrium for our game. Let a: be the marginal 
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relaxed control function of player 1 induced by rr*. If G is a Bore1 subset 
of U,, then g:(G ) t) = a*(G x Uz x . . . x U, 1 t), t E T. Similarly 0:‘s are 
defined for all i E N- { 11. Then it is easy to conclude from (3) that 
(a:, *.., ~2) is a Nash equilibrium point for our game. Thus, our result 
implies Theorem 1 of [ 141. 
Remark 2. The function d + P,(a) is continuous on Z, for each ie N. 
This follows immediately from our assumptions, (4) and (5). Also the func- 
tion g + Pi(fi, aPi) is continuous on Z, for every ie N and fin Ci. This 
function is obviously continuous on Li, endowed with the weak-star 
topology. Now observe that the convergence of a sequence {I+‘} to some a0 
in .Z implies the convergence of the corresponding sequence {o”_ ,} to 00; 
in Zui. Hence the function 0 -+ Pi (fi, 0 -i) is indeed continuous on C. 
These observations imply that the set of correlated relaxed equilibria is 
compact under our assumptions on the primitive data. It is worth mentioning 
that this set is also convex. This follows immediately from (4), (5) (6), 
and (v). 
Remark 3. Correlated strategies in this paper are joint relaxed control 
functions of the players. Using such a strategy the players control the 
system, like one person having U as the control space. In [13], we define 
another correlation scheme where a correlated strategy is (as in bimatrix 
games) a probability distribution concentrated at finitely many pairs of 
ordinary (pure) control functions of the players. We consider in [ 131 much 
more general dynamical system and payoff functions, but obtain 
approximate equilibria only. 
2. PROOF OF THE EQIJILIBRIUM THEOREM 
Our proof is not based on any fixed point argument. We use a com- 
pletely new method applying a minimax argument. An important tool in 
our approach is Fan’s minimax theorem [ 61: 
MINIMAX THEOREM. Let X be a nonempty compact Hausdorff space and 
let Y be a nonempty set. Let K: Xx Y + R be a real-valued function. 
Assume that K is concave-like in its first argument; that is, for every x,, 
x2 E X, and jl E [O, 11, there exists xl E X such that for all y E Y we have 
PK(x,,~)+(l--P)K(x,,~)dK(xp,y), 
and assume that K is convex-like in its second argument. That is, for every 
y,, y, E Y, and /? E [0, 11, there exists yp E Y such that for all x E X we have 
BK(x,~,)+(l-B)K(x,y,)~K(x,y,). 
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If in addition K( ., y) is upper semicontinuous on X, .for each y E Y, then 
max inf K(x, y) = t;f, Tsa; K(x, y). 1 E x .I‘ E Y 
Proof of Equilibrium Theorem. In our proof we construct an auxiliary 
zero-sum game and show that any maxinf strategy in this game is a 
correlated equilibrium point for the differential game. 
The game is played by two players, say A and B. Player A in some sense 
represents the m players in the differential game and his strategy space is 
C, the set of all correlated relaxed strategies in that game. The set of 
strategies for player B is 
Q= {(a,, . ..) a ,,.f, ,..., f,):a,>O,a,+ ... +a,,=l,J;EE1,iEN}. 
The payoff function K to player A (who is the maximizer) is given by 
where cr~2, (C(~, . . .. cl,,,,fi, . . . . f,,,)~&?. 
Note that, for every (c(i, . . . . CC,, fi, . . . . fm) E 52, the function 
K[I., (aI, . . . . a,, .fi, . . . . fJ1 is continuous and affine on Z (see Remark 2). 
Now we show that K is affine-like on Sz; that is, for every (al, . . . . a,, 
fi, . . . . f,), (a;, . . . . a;, f;, . . . . fk) E Q, and every /I E [0, l] there exists 
(a?, . . . . a% f:, . . . . f z) E 52 such that, for all CJ E C, we have 
KCo, (6, -., a$ f?, . . . . .fZ )I 
= PKCa, (a,, . . . . a,, h, . . . . f,)l + (1 - B) KCa, (4, . . . . a;, J’i, . . . . fl,)l. 
(8) 
It is easy to check that, for each i E A’, 
aI*=Pa;+(l--fl)a; and f?=(fla,fi+(l -P)a(fl)/aT 
satisfy 
CPi(a)-Pi(f:~ a-i)] a* 
=BCPi(a)-Pi(fi, a-i)1 a;+(1 -p)[p,(~)-PP,(f:, Oel)] a: 
for all (r E C. This obviously implies (8). 
By Fan’s minimax theorem, our zero-sum game has a value and player 
A has an optimal strategy. We show that the value is nonnegative. Let 
(a 1, . . . . a,, fi, . . . . f,) E C2 and let rr be the product relaxed control function 
409 Ih? l-8 
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from Z determined by the control functions ficCi (i= 1, . . . . m); that is, 
a(. 1 t) is the product of the measures f,(. ) t), . . . . f,(. 1 t) for every t E T. 
Then we have that K[a, (tll, . . . . CI,, f,, . . . . fm)] = 0 and this implies that the 
value is nonnegative. 
Let CJ* be an optimal strategy for player A. Then 
for all (~1,) . .. . tl,, f,, . . . . f,) E Q. 
Take any i E N and any f. E Zi. Assume that 0~~ + 0 for all j # i. Then 
ai + 1 and from (7) we obtain that 
Pi(O*) - Pi(~fi, 0*-i) ~ 0. 
Thus, C* is a correlated equilibrium point for the nonzero-sum differential 
game. 
Remark 4. From the above proof, it follows that a correlated relaxed 
equilibrium point can be obtained by maximizing the concave function 
where (r E Z and Z is a compact convex set. 
Remark 5. The usual approach to Nash equilibria, based on 
Kakutani-Glicksberg’s fixed point theorem, does not yield any result for 
our game model. The reason is that the payoff functions (2) are not con- 
tinuous on Z‘, x ... xx,, equipped with the product weak-star topology. 
For a detailed discussion on this topic see [3, Example 2.6; 16, 1X.2.21. 
This fact is not relevant when we deal with correlated equilibria. 
3. CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA AND CLOSED LOOP STRATEGIES 
In this section, we assume that the players can observe the state x(t) at 
each moment TV T. Then their strategies (correlated or individual) can also 
take into account the state variable and are called closed-loop strategies. 
The equilibrium theorem of Section 1 states that our linear differential 
game possesses a correlated equilibrium point C* in the class of open-loop 
controls of the players. Applying an argument given in [5, p. 173, we infer 
that (z* is also an equilibrium in the broader class of closed-loop strategies. 
For this, let f: be any closed-loop strategy of player i and let 
x(t, f F, 05~) be a trajectory of the linear differential equation corre- 
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sponding to the controls .fy and o?,. Define an open-loop strategy .f; for 
player i as 
t-i(t) ==.f;(t, x(t, .f:, 0% ,117 tE T. 
Then x(t, ,f”;, a*-,) also satisfies the linear differential equation (4) with o 
replaced by ,f, and (T* ; and from the definition of ,f;, it follows that 
P, (.f :, o* I) = P, u;, CT* I), 
Combining this equality and (6), we obtain 
P,(o*) 3 P,(.fP, CT.* ,I. 
Thus, CJ* is a correlated equilibrium in the class of closed-loop strategies. 
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